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Political psychologists often treat explicit explanations for political views as
rationalizations rather than reasons and favor unconscious motives and cognitive processes as the key determinants of political ideology. We argue
that “transparent-motive” theories are often dismissed too quickly in favor of
“subterranean-motive” theories. We devote this chapter to ﬁnding common
methodological ground for clarifying, testing, and circumscribing the claims of
both the transparent-motivational theorists and the subterranean-motivational
theorists, and we pose a series of empirical questions designed to explore predictions that might provide evidence that justiﬁcations are not mere by-products
of the functional imperative to defend the status quo but rather functionally autonomous constellations of ideas capable of independently inﬂuencing policy.
Over the last 150 years, behavioral scientists have repeatedly revealed their
deep skepticism of the reasons that ordinary mortals offer for their political
views. As an epistemic community, we have shown a marked preference for
“subterranean-motivational theories”—theories predicated on the assumption that people have little access to the true drivers of their judgments.
Indeed, under this subterranean rubric we include a truly diverse mix of
scholars, ranging from the Freudian to the evolutionary to the Marxist: psychodynamic scholars, such as Lasswell (1930) and Adorno and colleagues
(1950), who view political attitudes as the product of the displacement of
private motives onto public objects rationalized in terms of the common
good; evolutionary and social-dominance theorists who argue that people
derive psychic gratiﬁcation from exercising symbolic dominance over those
below them in the pecking order (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Platto, 2001);
system justiﬁcation theorists who posit a deep-rooted psychological tendency to justify existing status hierarchies (a tendency that bears a marked
family resemblance to the classic Marxist notion of false consciousness—Jost
& Banaji, 1994; Jost, 1995); and social identity theorists who maintain that
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self-esteem needs guided by rapid-ﬁre categorization processes are responsible for the widespread phenomenon of invidious ingroup-outgroup stereotyping (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004).
We do not doubt that good reasons often exist for doubting the reasons
people offer for their policy stands—and for suspecting that these reasons
do not capture the true causal dynamics behind their opinions. We readily
concede that there are serious cognitive limits on our introspective access to
mental processes—and powerful sources of social desirability distortion operating on what people are willing to say. But, like the plain-spoken sociologist, C. Wright Mills (1940), we worry about “motive-mongering.” Indeed, if
we were inclined to subterranean-motivational speculation of our own, we
might suggest that subterranean motives drive the intense curiosity of social
scientists in subterranean motives—be it the preventive goal of ensuring that
their research conclusions not be labeled obvious or the promotional goal of
being proclaimed profound. We also worry that in a discipline as ideologically lopsided as political psychology, the subterranean-motivational speculation can easily become skewed against groups in collective disfavor (Arkes &
Tetlock, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006; Redding, 2004;
Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1991).
Whatever the merits of such speculation, we are acutely aware of how
difﬁcult it is to resolve disputes over the merits of transparent versus subterranean-motivational theories—and distinguish reason from rationalization
in social, personality, organizational, and political psychology. (One of us
wrote many years ago on the indeterminacy problems that bedeviled far less
politically charged efforts to distinguish cognitive from motivational, and
“intrapsychic” from impression management, explanations in a variety of
experimental paradigms; Tetlock & Levi, 1982; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985.)
But we do think it vital—for reasons laid out later—to try. And we devote
this chapter to ﬁnding common methodological ground for clarifying, testing, and circumscribing the claims of both the transparent-motivational theorists and the subterranean-motivational theorists.
We divide our chapter into three sections. In the ﬁrst, we make our case
for an underutilized methodology: transforming political-philosophical
thought experiments into psychological experiments. In the second section,
we describe a series of hypothetical-society laboratory studies that we have
conducted over the last 15 years to explore the value judgments that guide
people when they make “macro-distributive” judgment calls about the fairness of resource allocations on a societal and even global scale. These studies allow us to compare how closely the belief and value systems of actual
human beings resemble a host of conceptual ideal types, including intuitive
Rawlsians (who give priority to raising the guaranteed safety net income),
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intuitive libertarians (who give priority to minimizing redistribution and
maximizing aggregate wealth), intuitive Marxists (who reject all forms of
class subjugation), intuitive Durkheimians (who place a premium on the
solidarity-expressive functions of punishment), and value-pluralist pragmatists (who strike varying compromises between equality and efﬁciency—and
other values). In the third section, we pose a series of questions designed to
explore what, if any, predictions can be derived from system justiﬁcation
theory (SJT) and kindred subterranean formulations in the hypotheticalsociety context—and to determine the types of evidence necessary to induce
advocates of such theories to change their minds: to view justiﬁcations not as
by-products of the functional imperative to defend the status quo but rather
as functionally autonomous constellations of ideas capable of independently
inﬂuencing policy. The theoretical debate is as old as that between Marx and
Weber: How do interests (traditionally stressed by Marxists) and ideas (traditionally stressed by Weberians) interact to shape our vision of who we collectively are and what we should collectively aspire to achieve?

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

TURNING THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
INTO LAB EXPERIMENTS
Carefully conducted thought experiments help philosophers clarify the role
of competing principles and assumptions in their normative arguments,
much like laboratory experiments help psychologists clarify the role of different variables in cause–effect relationships. In the mind of a philosopher
committed to working out the logical implications of propositions in alternative worlds, the thought experiment can be a rigorous means to an end:
“She follows through all the relevant implications of altering one part of
her worldview and attempts to construct a coherent model of the situation
she is imagining. The rigor with which thought experimenters attempt to
answer ‘what if’ questions is what differentiates thought experiments from
daydreams and much ﬁction. . . . The thought experimenter is committed to
rigorously considering all relevant consequences in answering the ‘what if’
questions” (Cooper, 2005, p. 337).
Thought experiments, however, even when done carefully and with a
mind open to possibilities rather than searching for conﬁrmation, lack the
transparency and replicability deemed essential to scientiﬁc research (Bunge,
1961). These weaknesses lead many to dismiss the thought experiment as
a path to reliable knowledge (see Sorenson, 1992, Chapter 2). Thus, when
scientists successfully employ thought experiments—Galileo, Newton, and
Einstein come quickly to mind—the resulting theories must be couched in
publicly testable terms to qualify as scientiﬁc (Dennett, 2003).
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Thought experiments also present serious external validity concerns.
Whereas laboratory researchers can make some claim that their ﬁndings represent the views of a cross-section of college students reacting to real, if simulated, situations, thought experimenters can make no claim that their ﬁndings
represent the views of people in general, or even philosophers speciﬁcally,
reacting to realistic simulations. Indeed, many philosophical debates persist
because philosophers reach different conclusions about hypothetical cases or
the validity of background assumptions in these cases (e.g., Coleman, 2000),
and the very purpose of many thought experiments is to create unreal situations that can exist only in the imagination (Souder, 2003).
For the empiricist who ﬁnds a thought experiment interesting but doubts
the reliability and generalizability of its product, a simple solution exists:
reduce the thought experiment to concrete terms that can be reproduced as
written scenarios and ask subjects to react to the scenarios to see what trends
emerge (e.g., Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004). The emerging ﬁeld of
experimental philosophy seeks to do just this with a variety of conundrums
(Knobe, in press). But that view emphasizes what laboratory studies can do
for thought experiments and philosophical explorations. In our view, thought
experiments can do much for laboratory studies and the social-psychological
explorations of a variety of topics, including the psychological foundations
of lay conceptions of justice.
Empirical studies into the perceived justice of real-world outcomes and
procedures confront difﬁculties that may be partially remedied by incorporating elements of thought experiments into these studies. First, and almost
impossible to control in empirical studies of public reasoning on current controversies, is the problem that public opinion often depends on mixtures of
emotionally charged political values (such as liberty, equality, religious purity, and national sovereignty) and technically complex matters of fact (such
as whether individual or societal conditions are greater determinants of
economic outcomes or whether tying welfare beneﬁts to work requirements
will encourage self-sufﬁciency). When causal relations and policy effects are
difﬁcult to determine, a powerful temptation exists to arrange one’s beliefs
about the facts in convenient ways that minimize dissonance and mental
strain (e.g., Herrmann, Tetlock, & Diascro, 2001; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers,
& Ordóñez, 1993; Skitka, 1999). For instance, Skitka and Tetlock (1992, 1993)
found that liberals and conservatives held different preexisting beliefs about
the causes of public assistance and, as a result, made different trade-offs in a
mock public aid allocation task. Thus, surveys that ﬁnd different views about
distributive justice between liberals and conservatives, but fail to check for
differences in background beliefs, may mistakenly attribute response differences to value differences. Conversely, surveys that ﬁnd agreement across
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groups regarding distributive justice and the propriety of redistribution may
simply reﬂect widespread mistaken beliefs about underlying facts, such as
the degree of economic mobility in a society (see Ferrie, 2005; Fong, 2005) or
the proportion of families in different socio-economic categories (see Kluegel, Csepeli, Kolosi, Orkeny, & Nemenyi, 1995). These problems become
particularly acute when one studies the impact of macroeconomic variables
and system-level conditions on individual judgments of justice, but informational problems may arise whenever key facts are vague or disputed (e.g., the
bargaining studies of Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995).
To overcome such confusion, we took a page from the philosopher’s book
on thought experiments and developed a “hypothetical-society paradigm,”
in which experimental participants judge the justice of different economic
and legal arrangements in hypothetical societies (Mitchell et al., 1993).1 This
paradigm turns the classic weakness of thought experiments, their unreality
and subjectivity, into a strength: because the experimenter is the creator of
the hypothetical societies, the experimenter controls the structure of these
societies down to the tiniest technical details, including the location of the
poverty line and percentage of persons below it, mean income and income
variance within the society, levels of redistribution and welfare services,
the level of meritocracy (i.e., the degree to which individual merit versus
other factors determine economic outcomes), and whether the hypothetical society is in the “original position” or considering changes to existing
procedures and distributions. Using the hypothetical-society approach, an
investigator can examine which features of societies are most important to
people’s judgments of social justice and determine how these judgments
change as features of the societies change. In short, the paradigm allows

1

The inspiration for the hypothetical-society paradigm was Rawls’ impartial reasoning

device, the “veil of ignorance,” which seeks to “nullify the effects of speciﬁc contingencies
which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their
own advantage” (Rawls, 1971, p. 136). Behind the veil, “no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, 1971, p. 137). Because
we cannot divest participants of self-knowledge as required by a true veil of ignorance, we
chose instead to remove narrow self-interest as an inﬂuence on judgments by having participants disinterestedly evaluate hypothetical societies. Our efforts to approximate Rawls’
original position were predated by Brickman (1977) and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992).
Appendices in Mitchell et al. (1993) and Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, and Lerner (2003) provide detailed descriptions of the hypothetical societies, the instructions given to participants,
and the participants’ tasks.
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researchers to unconfound the inﬂuence of factual beliefs from that of value
orientations in judgments of justice. Because individuals tend to avoid value
trade-offs, often by interpreting ambiguous or disputed facts in a favorable
light (e.g., Tetlock & McGuire, 1986), this ability to manipulate value conﬂict
confers considerable experimental advantages.
One key beneﬁt of importing hypothetical societies into the laboratory is
the control one gains over otherwise complex and sharply contested matters
of fact. A second, arguably equally important, beneﬁt involves the control
one gains over the inﬂuence of selﬁsh interests. A common problem in empirical studies of justice is that of distinguishing biased from unbiased judgments (see Fong et al., 2006; Konow, 2005; Liebig, 2001). The hypotheticalsociety paradigm allows researchers to place participants in the position of
impartial spectator: researchers who want to eliminate or minimize the role
of material self-interest and social inﬂuence on judgments ask participants to
make anonymous judgments about hypothetical societies with no material
implications for themselves. Alternatively, researchers interested in the role
of social inﬂuences can ask participants to explain or justify their judgments
under various accountability conditions, or can manipulate the group identities involved, whereas researchers interested in the inﬂuence of material selfinterest can alter the method to have participants imagine themselves inside
the society or ask them to allocate resources within the society (using either
hypothetical or real pay-offs).
In our hypothetical-society studies, we have favored experimental manipulations that place the participant in the role of impartial spectator, in
order to capture unbiased judgments of justice. As a number of studies have
shown, when participants have a stake in the distribution at hand, egocentric and ingroup biases will often inﬂuence participants’ judgments about
the fairness of these distributions (Bar-Hillel & Yaari, 1993; Epley & Caruso,
2004; Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1997, 2000; Greenberg, 1983; Konow, 2005;
Messick & Sentis, 1983; Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003). We cannot trust that
unbiased judgments of justice will be given when individuals judge their
own situations, and so, if we seek to know what people believe justice ideally requires, “thought experiments trump real experiments (Cooper, 2005,
p. 344).”2

2

Cooper (2005) makes this point in the context of thought experiments involving trade-offs

between avoiding torture to oneself versus avoiding harm to others, where what we seek to
know is not what the tortured person would actually do but what a rational person should
do in such a situation: “The judgments of people contemplating what should be done under
torture are more reliable than the judgments of people actually being tortured (p. 344).”
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That said, judgments about justice by detached observers of hypothetical
societies may still be useful guides about judgments of justice in real societies. Most obviously, to the extent that hypothetical societies and real societies
possess common features important to lay conceptions of justice, judgments
about justice in the hypothetical societies may generalize to real societies.
Even with highly artiﬁcial scenarios, judgments about hypothetical societies
can identify pivotal points of agreement and disagreement and explain how
factual beliefs and value differences combine to produce either ideological
convergence or divergence. For instance, in our ﬁrst set of hypotheticalsociety studies (Mitchell et al., 1993), we found surprisingly wide agreement
on the importance of minimum safety nets, even in perfect meritocracies.
Hypothetical-society studies also shed light on which social arrangements
may have the greatest “psychological stability” (see Elster, 1995). Our studies have found, for example, that conservatives are more sensitive to waste
in income redistribution policies (“leaky buckets”) than liberals when the
redistribution was meant for deserving recipients (Mitchell et al., 2003), suggesting that the psychological stability of policy arrangements depends on
the mix of liberal and conservative decision makers, the perceived deservingness of would-be recipients in the applicant pool, and the leakiness of the
income transfer process (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992, 1993).
More ambitiously, to the extent that the judgments individuals reach as
impartial spectators cause individuals to reﬂect on just distributions in their
own societies, the hypothetical-society paradigm could be used as a device
to foster deliberation about social policy (e.g., Fishkin, 1992). If used in this
sense, the hypothetical-society paradigm performs a “reﬂective equilibrium”
function (Rawls, 1971; see Daniels, 1996), possibly leading persons to abandon their initial intuitions or change their views about what justice requires
once they are compelled to work their way through a series of controlled
thought experiments.
In sum, the hypothetical-society paradigm can be a powerful tool for
overcoming the limitations of alternative methods, including the problems of
replication and “idiosyncratic intuition” that plague philosophical thought
experiments on justice, and the problems of partiality—with respect both to
facts and motivations—that plague lab and ﬁeld studies of justice.3

3

A closely related device for studying justice judgments is the vignette study (e.g., Bukszar &

Knetsch, 1997; Konow, 2003). Vignette studies typically ask experimental or survey participants to judge whether justice occurred in some realistic but imaginary event (e.g.,
pay distribution in a hypothetical work setting). The advantage of a vignette study over
a hypothetical-society study is that the former possesses greater external validity. The

Jost, John T., et al. Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, Oxford University Press,
2009. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=430365.
Created from upenn-ebooks on 2018-02-02 13:15:02.

Disentangling Reasons and Rationalizations

133

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

TAKING STOCK OF THE CURRENT EMPIRICAL YIELD
FROM HYPOTHETICAL-SOCIETY STUDIES
Most studies using the hypothetical-society paradigm examine the perceived
justice of societal-level patterns of distribution or rules for distributing resources within a society, and so we begin with ﬁndings from these studies
on social justice. We ﬁrst utilized the paradigm to examine how people make
macro-level trade-offs between equality and efﬁciency. Speciﬁcally, we described for participants three different societies that differed in their levels
of meritocracy, with the correlation between effort and outcome being high
(a correlation of 0.9), medium (a correlation of 0.5), or low (a correlation of
0.1), and we displayed income distributions within each society that varied
in terms of their equality (income variance) and efﬁciency (average income).
(For a full description of the hypothetical-society instructions and stimuli,
see the Appendix to Mitchell et al., 1993.) Participants were asked to imagine
themselves as outside observers of the societies and to make pair-wise comparisons of all possible income distributions for one of the societies, choosing
which distribution in each pair was fairer, so that a fairness ranking of income
distributions could be derived for each individual within a society and for
groups of individuals across all three hypothetical societies. These fairness
rankings were then compared to a variety of ideal-type fairness rankings
for the income distributions derived from competing theories of distributive
justice, namely, egalitarianism (emphasizing equality), utilitarianism (emphasizing efﬁciency), a Rawlsian maximin principle (emphasizing quality
subject to efﬁciency constraints), and Boulding’s (1962) compromise theory
(emphasizing efﬁciency subject to equality constraints—in which minimum
equality is required by the government ensuring a safety net for the poor, but
the goal of prosperity is encouraged by rewarding individual effort above
this social safety net).
Consistent with Boulding’s (1962) compromise theory, as well as with
later value-pluralism ideas (Tetlock, 1984, 1986), both liberals and conservatives were willing to accept considerable inequality of wealth in highmeritocracy societies but with the reservation that distributions allowing
people to fall below the poverty line remained unpopular for both ideo-

disadvantage of the vignette study relative to the hypothetical-society study is that, because
the participant may ﬁnd the vignette more realistic and familiar, the participant may ﬁnd it
more difﬁcult to imagine or accept the stipulated facts and detach herself from the situation
about which she is supposed to be an impartial judge, and the researcher has less freedom
when creating hypothetical situations.
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logical groups even in high-meritocracy societies (a ﬁnding similar to that
of Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1992, whose experimental groups favored
utilitarianism above a ﬂoor constraint). However, a majority of liberals and
conservatives favored a Rawlsian “maximin” approach (Rawls, 1971) to the
distribution of wealth in low- and moderate-meritocracy societies (a ﬁnding
at odds with Frohlich and Oppenheimer [1992] and one that suggests that
implicit assumptions of meritocracy may have driven Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s groups to favor a modiﬁed utilitarianism). Liberals and conservatives disagreed most sharply when the reward structure in the hypothetical
society was most ambiguous (i.e., in the moderate-meritocracy society), with
liberals tending toward greater equality and conservatives toward greater
efﬁciency in such societies. Thus, we found that, for both ideological groups,
beliefs about the level of meritocracy in the hypothetical society moderated
value trade-offs, suggesting that ideological disagreements about social justice may arise just as often from different beliefs about the nature of the
reward structure in society as from value differences (compare Fong, 2004,
reporting that target-speciﬁc beliefs regarding individual responsibility for
economic outcomes drove attitudes toward redistributive policies).
In a subsequent hypothetical-society study using similar experimental
stimuli (Mitchell et al., 2003), we again found that the perceived level of
meritocracy in a society greatly affected judgments about the justice of distributions in that society, with support for greater equality (and less prosperity) strongest at low levels of meritocracy and support for greater prosperity
(and less equality) strongest at high levels of meritocracy. In this study, we
also manipulated whether participants were judging the fairness of income
distributions as if they were alternative original distributions for each society
versus as if they were redistributions of income from an existing distribution
in each society. When participants judged redistributions (i.e., when it was
clear that income would be taken from one group and redistributed to another), both liberals and conservatives became more sensitive to the level of
meritocracy in the society, and considered redistributions in the moderateand high-meritocracy societies to be signiﬁcantly less fair than equivalent
distributions viewed as alternative starting distributions in the same societies. Further, for all three societies, including a “no-meritocracy” society with
no relation between effort and outcomes, participants judged redistributions
that led to losses in equality or losses in prosperity to be less fair than when
they simply judged the fairness of these distributions as possible “original
positions,” suggesting a vicarious type of loss aversion at work even in judgments about hypothetical redistributions.
These ﬁndings highlight both the practical problems faced by advocates
of redistributive policies and the conceptual problems faced by political phi-
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losophers grappling with whether (or when) the distributive–redistributive
distinction should count in normative theories of justice. These ﬁndings also
highlight interpretive ambiguities that arise for psychological theorists in
characterizing the true causes of resistance to redistribution. If people resist
redistribution because they have a tendency to adopt the status quo as their
reference point and to be loss-averse (directly or vicariously), as prospect theory predicts, is it accurate or fair to characterize such automatic psychophysical processes with as politically charged a label as system justiﬁcation?4
Providing further empirical evidence against a unidimensional conception of distributive justice such as utilitarianism and in favor of a multidimensional conception such as in Boulding’s compromise theory, Ordóñez and
Mellers (1993) used the hypothetical-society paradigm to examine whether
individuals make trade-offs when judging social fairness. They found that
the great majority of participants did make trade-offs between different principles, but the principles that most concerned their participants were need
and desert, with participants wanting to ensure a minimum salary for all
members of the hypothetical society but also wanting to provide just deserts
to those who worked hard in the society; equality and efﬁciency were of little
concern to participants in this study. This study is also interesting because
Ordóñez and Mellers asked participants to make judgments about the fairness of societies, but also to express preferences for societies as places to live.
They found that most participants rated high-meritocracy societies as fair, but
they preferred to live in societies with high minimum incomes (a ﬁnding that
applied particularly to participants with self-reported low socio-economic
status). This ﬁnding is consistent with the view that the hypothetical-society
paradigm can be used to elicit both reﬁned justice judgments and preference
judgments reﬂecting self-interest rather than ethical concerns.
Recently, Scott and his colleagues (Scott, Matland, Michelbach, & Bornstein, 2001) employed a variant of the hypothetical-society paradigm to compare the role of equality, efﬁciency, merit, and need in people’s judgments

4

Although system justiﬁcation theorists draw on status quo bias research to support their

theory (Jost, 2001), we see nothing intrinsically system justifying about prospect theory. Prospect theory processes can just as easily fuel moral outrage as moral complacency toward the
status quo (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). For instance, prospect theory identiﬁes
factors that should make it easier to mobilize the losers in an earlier “illegitimate” round
of redistribution to take big risks to restore the status quo ante (McDermott, 1998). Similar
processes could also be at work driving intense resistance to the impact of global capitalism
on climate change or driving Islamic radicals to restore the original Islamic state. From our
standpoint, the “system” in system justiﬁcation is underdeﬁned.
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of distributive justice, ﬁnding that each principle proved inﬂuential to some
extent, except that merit considerations only inﬂuenced women’s judgments of justice in this study. In a second study, this research group (Michelbach, Scott, Matland, & Bornstein, 2003) replicated their ﬁnding that individuals try to balance equality, efﬁciency, need, and merit in their justice
judgments, but they failed to replicate the gender gap in meritocracy concerns found in their ﬁrst study. However, this second study did ﬁnd a racial
gap in meritocracy concerns, with the nature of equality-efﬁciency trade-offs
by White participants dependent on their merit assumptions but not those
of racial minorities. Also, Michelbach and colleagues (2003), with a reﬁnement to the hypothetical-society paradigm that provided a cleaner test between egalitarianism and Rawls’ maximin principle than that employed in
our original study (Mitchell et al., 1993), found that a signiﬁcant number of
participants endorsed the maximin principle, but many others deemed merit
an important principle and deviated from a strict adherence to the maximin
principle.
These studies by Scott and others support our original ﬁnding (Mitchell
et al., 1993) that impartial spectators often place considerable weight on
equality and the maximin principle when making justice judgments, especially when meritocracy is lacking. However, these studies and their ﬁndings of gender and racial gaps in the weight placed on meritocracy in justice
judgments also caution against generalizations about the role of meritocracy
in justice judgments and suggest that White men, women, and minorities,
who may have had very different experiences with meritocracy in the United
States, may have difﬁculty divesting themselves of their life experiences and
placing themselves in the position of impartial observer.
Most recently, we used the hypothetical-society paradigm to examine
the longstanding debate in legal theory on the relationship between corrective justice and distributive justice (Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006).5 Some legal
philosophers claim that corrective justice is parasitic on distributive justice,
with the one who has caused a harm (the “tortfeasor” in legalese) having
a duty only to repair the harm imposed on another if the underlying distribution of goods disturbed was just, whereas others claim that corrective
justice and distributive justice impose independent moral demands on mem-

5

Corrective justice stipulates, roughly, that a person who wrongfully causes harm to another

has a duty to repair the harm (see Forde-Mazrui, 2004). The concept of corrective justice goes
back to Aristotle and his distinction between justice in transactions, or arithmetic forms of
justice, and justice in overall distributions within a polity, or geometric forms justice (see
Weinrib, 2002).
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bers of a society that cannot be traded off against one another. To test the
competing views, we constructed distributively just and unjust hypothetical societies—with distributive justice operationalized in terms of meeting
needs, equality, and desert—and told participants of certain intentional and
unintentional torts occurring in these societies that upset the distribution of
resources in these just and unjust societies. The task for participants was to
declare whether justice required the tortfeasor to make the victim of the tort
whole, as a norm of corrective justice would require.
We found, somewhat to our surprise in light of much empirical research
showing the context sensitivity of competing norms of justice (see Miller,
1999), that the norm of corrective justice consistently trumped distributive
justice norms, even where enforcing the norm of corrective justice would lead
to a more unjust distribution of resources in the community (i.e., in a society
with no meritocracy, where an undeserving poor man had to compensate an
undeserving rich man for harm negligently done by the poor man, leading
to greater inequality and greater unmet needs). Indeed, in many conditions,
there was near unanimity that the tortfeasor should make the victim whole,
even when participants judged the society to be unjust and the victim had
insurance that would cover the harm done.
Only under conditions of extreme injustice in the distribution of resources
did most participants deem it just that tortious harm go unrepaired. Thus, in
a hypothetical society in which a racial minority perpetuated its hold over
power through discriminatory policies, most liberal participants and some
conservative participants felt that justice did not require that an impoverished member of the oppressed majority compensate a wealthy member
of the racially oppressive minority who had been harmed by the former’s
negligence. However, when the poor member of the racially oppressed class
intentionally stole a valuable watch owned by the rich man, most participants judged this action out of bounds as a matter of justice, even though
it arguably is a form of self-help that would lead to a more just distribution
of wealth in this racially unjust society (with half of the liberal participants
and more than half of the conservative participants judging justice to require
compensation for this intentional tort).
Such ﬁndings are signiﬁcant in at least two ways. First, they demonstrate the importance of adding corrective justice norms to the list of justice
concerns that may be triggered by context (see Konow, 2003), and they illustrate that this norm will be potent, and likely dominant, in contexts that
emphasize transactional harms. These ﬁndings emphasize the importance
placed on personal responsibility for rectifying harms done, at least among
our sample of Americans, and cast into doubt the popularity of social compensation schemes for accidents, such as New Zealand’s taxpayer-funded,
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no-fault accident fund. To date, there has been little research into corrective
justice, but our ﬁndings point out the need to understand the scope, source,
and function of the norm of corrective justice and its relation to retributive
justice, which has received more empirical attention (e.g., Darley & Pittman,
2003; Tetlock et al., 2007), but both of which have received less attention than
distributive and procedural justice.
Second, these ﬁndings further illustrate the malleability of the hypothetical-society paradigm. Outside the admittedly highly stylized hypotheticalsociety paradigm, it would be very difﬁcult to disentangle competing theoretical positions on the relationship between norms of distributive and
corrective justice. The simplicity of the paradigm makes it easy to eliminate
confounding variables and test alternative explanations for why people view
certain social arrangements to be just or unjust. We explore some of the untapped potential of the hypothetical-society paradigm in the next section.

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

USING HYPOTHETICAL SOCIETIES TO CLARIFY RIVAL
THEORETICAL POSITIONS
The hypothetical-society paradigm arguably gives us a chance to glimpse
relatively pure value judgments, undistorted by the usual real-world mix of
either clashing interest groups or clashing ideological views of the magnitude and causes of social problems. We ﬁnd that, although some respondents
do ﬁt sharply deﬁned ideological ideal types—committed egalitarians and
libertarians—the aggregate data are more consistent with an alternative portrait of how most people make decisions in these spectator roles: a value pluralism account (Berlin, 1990; Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996).
It is as if people were trying—not necessarily successfully—to balance competing values, with the relative importance of certain values holding quite
ﬁrm against the counter-pressures thus far applied and the relative importance of other values showing considerable lability and context speciﬁcity.
The stablest commitments so far seem to be to a safety net and corrective
justice. Like good egalitarian collectivists, people care a lot about ensuring
that no one falls below a basic-need safety net across a wide range of circumstances (Frankfurt, 1987), and like good property-rights individualists (and
also Durkheimians, in Tetlock et al., 2007), people care a lot about ensuring
that norm violators are punished across a wide array of socio-economic background conditions. If we gave voice to these sentiments, they might sound
like this: “Give us safety nets (for we know that people can fall far through
no fault of their own—and in any event, it pains us to see others suffer), but
hold all norm violators, even the poor, accountable to the precepts of corrective justice, lest we revert to the law of the jungle.”
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By contrast, other values oscillate more in importance across background
societal conditions. Like good egalitarian collectivists, people give heaviest
weight to equality when they think the society has deviated from the ideals of meritocracy, but like good capitalist individualists, people give heaviest weight to efﬁciency and wealth maximization—and resist redistribution
most intensely—when society is highly meritocratic and the wealth transfer
process inefﬁcient (a “leaky bucket” for transferring assets). Also, intriguingly, people are most likely to polarize along ideological lines when there
is greatest ambiguity about meritocracy—arguably the most realistic of the
conditions in hypothetical-society experiments, as our participants consistently liken American society to the moderate-meritocracy society in our
studies—perhaps a sign that real-world conditions create the most room for
implicit ideological values (better to err in the leftward or rightward direction) to come into play.
Skeptics of the hypothetical-society paradigm could argue, however, that
it only taps into relatively superﬁcial psychological processes to which people have ready conscious access and that people are not embarrassed about
revealing. The skeptics would be correct that we have thus far tended to
take the intuitive political philosophies of our respondents at face value. If
respondents say that they are Rawlsian egalitarians (Rawls, 1971) or Nozickian libertarians (Nozick, 1974) or value pluralists in the mold of Isaiah Berlin
(1990), and respond in that spirit to our instruments, we classify them accordingly. These ideal-type belief system models are best classiﬁed as transparent-motivational theories that make the working assumption that people
are lay political philosophers struggling to make sense of the world and balance reasonable arguments against each other. From the skeptics’ perspective, we have yet to explore seriously the possibility that motives to which
our respondents do not have conscious access (or might be embarrassed to
admit) are swaying their judgments of macro-level distributive justice. It is
useful, therefore, to consider how a system justiﬁcation theorist might explain our data—and explore how we might reconﬁgure hypothetical-society
experiments to clarify and eventually disentangle the predictions we might
expect from SJT and alternative accounts, such as our own.
System justiﬁcation theorists could argue that our ﬁndings are simply
a special case of their own demonstrations that people will accept explanations that justify the status quo, regardless of the objective accuracy of the
explanation (Haines & Jost, 2000). But our ﬁnding that respondents often
favored changes to a status quo that they judged unjust seems hard to square
with an authoritarian–acquiescence version of SJT. Nonetheless, system justiﬁcation theorists could counter that the motive to system-justify operates
only when one’s own status or societal hierarchy is at stake, in which case the
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hypothetical-society paradigm will be dismissed as too hypothetical to be
relevant.6 However, if cognitive and motivational components of system justiﬁcation are triggered automatically by status-relevant stimuli (e.g., Jost &
Hunyady, 2002), if system justiﬁcation processes are triggered regardless
of personal responsibility for the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), and if
system justiﬁcation beliefs comprise an “ideology” that people rely on to
interpret, respond to, and assimilate new stimuli (e.g., Blasi & Jost, 2006;
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), then the hypothetical nature of our societies—in
which we can simulate inequalities in existing societies but remove all ambiguity about causation—should not be a barrier to our experiments serving
as a testing ground for SJT.7
Alternatively, system justiﬁcation theorists could argue that hypothetical-society researchers have merely reconﬁrmed that people have a moral
preference for social orders roughly similar to the world they currently inhabit: democratic capitalist states, with safety nets of varying height, committed to individualistic norms of justice. Indeed, we would never dispute
that the societal status quo is a powerful anchor for moral-political judgment
(even in hypothetical societies, as our distribution/redistribution mindset
manipulation showed): we strongly suspect that if we could bring the vast
numbers of antebellum Americans who regarded slavery as a reasonable

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

6

To address this speciﬁc concern, we note that the hypothetical-society approach could be

modiﬁed to ﬁt a number of systems about which the experimenter could credibly claim to
have undisputed factual information, but that are much less hypothetical or unreal than in
our studies to date. Most promising would be a “hypothetical class action” study in which
the parties have stipulated to all relevant factual matters and agree on the future impact of
different remedies but disagree on the desirability of, or need for, different remedies. Participants then would be tasked with setting policy for the organization going forward, with the
policy options set along a continuum anchored by status quo preservation on one end and
radical reform on the other.
7

Indeed, the experimental paradigm employed by Jost and Burgess (2000) and discussed in

Jost (2001) bears some resemblance to our hypothetical-society studies. In that paradigm, the
experimenters manipulate participants’ perceptions of the relative socioeconomic success of
alumni of their own university and a competing university to examine how these perceptions
affect explanations for differential success and evaluations of these groups. Studies along
these lines, in which arcane matters of public policy are chosen such that participants may
be led to believe that facts associated with different policies are real, may be additional good
candidates for some of the “stress testing” of system justiﬁcation theory that we propose in
the next few subsections.
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accommodation in the mid-19th century into contemporary America, those
individuals would bear little psychological resemblance to whatever pathological fringe of the current population endorses race war and the oppression of minorities.8
We would counter that, at minimum, the hypothetical-society paradigm
has already revealed a good deal about what varying viewpoints consider
plausible justiﬁcations for varying social orders. For instance, it is telling
that even many hard-core conservatives embrace equality when confronted
with a hypothetical society in which one’s socio-economic status has been
determined randomly, not by skill and hard work. And even many hard-core
liberals embrace efﬁciency when confronted with a hypothetical society in
which one’s socio-economic status has been determined entirely by hard individual work, with no role for chance. If even the belief systems of hard-core
ideologues (who might be hypothesized to resemble in proﬁle extreme low
and high scorers on the system justiﬁcation scale) acknowledge boundary
conditions on their belief systems, so, too, should researchers who are trying to model the political-psychological functioning of these belief systems.
Indeed, we would argue that our studies, which focus on choices between
alternative social systems, provide more direct evidence on the operation
of putative system justiﬁcation motives than do system justiﬁcation studies
that focus on attitudes toward high- versus low-status groups that typically
are subject to both false- and veridical-consciousness interpretations.9 From
this standpoint, the largest lacuna in system justiﬁcation research is the paucity of research into the motive–behavior linkage—it is one thing to argue

8

We acknowledge, however, that the psychological similarities may be more pronounced be-

tween support for slavery in antebellum America and support for anti-redistributive policies
in the early 21st century. But we caution against the historicist fallacy that those similarities
shed light on who has the normative high ground in policy debates in the early 21st century.
For instance, the same integratively simple style of reasoning that led Churchill to oppose
self-government for India also led him to see Nazi Germany as an existential threat to the
British Empire—and the same absolutist reasoning that led ﬁre-eater defenders of slavery to
secede from the United States also led abolitionists to pressure Lincoln to deﬁne the Civil War
as a war against slavery (Tetlock, Armor, & Peterson, 1994).
9

Certainly some system justiﬁcation studies employ behavioral measures (e.g., Jost, Pelham, &

Carvallo, 2002) and assess preferences and beliefs potentially relevant to the social order (e.g.,
Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002; Jost, 1997), but many examine attitudes and stereotypes about
ingroups and outgroups that vary in their socioeconomic status and do not directly examine
system-justifying behaviors.
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that humans are adept at rationalizing outcomes and quite another to argue
that these rationalizations have deleterious effects on low-status groups (as
Blasi & Jost [2006] suggest is true with respect to underutilization of the legal
system by disadvantaged groups; see also O’Brien & Major [2005] and Jost &
Thompson [2000] for evidence on the positive and negative effects of systemjustifying beliefs on psychological well-being, respectively, for high- and
low-status groups).
We would also counter that existing hypothetical-society research
has barely scratched the surface of the conceptual complexities of macrolevel distributive justice—and of how ordinary people reason their way
through these dilemmas. The more we grapple with these complexities,
the more sharply we will understand both the strengths and limitations
of subterranean-motivational theories, such as SJT, and more transparentmotivation theories, such as the value pluralism model. Blasi and Jost (2006,
p. 1124) stake out a provocative position on the generality of the system justiﬁcation motive: “Most of the time, people have a general, inherently conservative tendency to accept the legitimacy of whatever ‘pecking order’ is
in effect and to perceive existing institutions and practices as generally reasonable and just, at least until proven otherwise.” We are unsure how much
we disagree with this claim, but we do believe that the hypothetical-society
paradigm provides a useful vehicle for clarifying the key points of ambiguity
that cause us to withhold judgment. Accordingly, we devote the remainder
of this chapter to identifying how the paradigm can be used to clarify and
test the predictions of the rival theoretical camps.
Clariﬁcation is the critical ﬁrst step because verbal theories can often be
read in many ways, and this is true both of our belief system ideal types derived from hypothetical-society work and of SJT. With that key caveat, our
reading of SJT is that the ideal-type system justiﬁer should be automatically
sympathetic, across a broad range of background conditions, to any hierarchy that resembles the system onto which that individual imprinted during
political socialization (Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004), whereas the ideal-type
antithesis of a system justiﬁer in the United States should strongly prefer
equality (or rebelliousness) across an equally broad range of societal background conditions. Insofar as ideologues at either end of this continuum
qualify their support for, or rejection of, inequality, we have evidence either
that these observers are mindlessly allowing for exceptions already permitted in their home society or that these observers are thoughtfully qualifying
their original one-size-ﬁts-all ideological templates by taking individuating
information into account. This difference is, in our view, a big one. If the latter, we have evidence for what we view as value-pluralism boundary conditions on system justiﬁcation: people may justify the status quo only up to
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the point at which they feel the status quo is justiﬁable given their internalized schemata and values for judging fair play. Put differently, such data
would show that the justiﬁcations in system justiﬁcation theory should not
be viewed as merely epiphenomenal; there may be a critical feedback linkage between the justiﬁcations that people articulate and the changes to the
systemic status quo they are willing to consider.

HOW RESOLUTELY SUPPORTIVE OF INEQUALITY
MUST ONE BE TO QUALIFY AS A SYSTEM JUSTIFIER?

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Unless system justiﬁcation theorists adopt the orthodox positivist position
that system justiﬁers are simply high scorers on the system justiﬁcation
scale—a position that hobbles cross-theory dialogue—we see a need to clarify the boundary conditions for distinguishing reﬂexive (mindless) system
justiﬁers from political observers whose value systems and sense of fair play
lead them to approve certain types of social-systemic arrangements—and
condemn others. Here, we see value in turning to the hypothetical-society
paradigm, because there are many ways to adapt this paradigm to probe
how far system justiﬁers are prepared to go in defending inequality (and the
types of dissonance-reduction strategies that they are prepared to use to trivialize awkward facts and to eliminate any need to change their minds). Here,
we consider the possible reactions of high system justiﬁers to two categories
of dissonant data: (a) those on intergenerational mobility, and (b) those on
the effects of free trade on national security.

“Tormenting” Conservatives with Dissonant Data
on Intergenerational Mobility
In the ﬁrst generation of hypothetical-society research, we were content
with crude operational deﬁnitions of meritocracy that manipulated the
relative importance of hard work versus luck in determining income. But
many observers ﬁnd it difﬁcult to view a society as meritocratic if one’s status is determined by genetic lottery—and the children of the relatively poor
have virtually no chance of rising into a higher class, whereas the children
of the relatively wealthy are virtually guaranteed of remaining in that class
(Rawls, 1971; Fishkin, 1983). It follows that social science research on intergenerational mobility has relatively high political stakes. As we saw in the
earlier hypothetical-society studies, most people move in an egalitarian or
leftward direction on income transfers when they are confronted with a lowmeritocracy society.
This raises the question of how high scorers on system justiﬁcation, or—as
we suspect they are—conservatives (for the view that political conservatism
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largely is system justiﬁcation, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003),
respond to hypothetical societies in which meritocracy is not speciﬁed but
must be inferred from data on intergenerational mobility. We conjecture that
the ﬁrst cognitive reaction of high system justiﬁers should be to assume that
the observed patterns of inequality are legitimate (or justiﬁed), and that cognitively sophisticated system justiﬁers should be predisposed to defend the
status quo by invoking the currently politically acceptable justiﬁcations for
inequality—namely, the system follows the norms of meritocracy and equality of opportunity. The hypothetical-society paradigm allows us, however, to
“stress test” this belief system by manipulating key background facts on intergenerational mobility that cut off favorite conservative dissonance reduction strategies. Promising manipulations include: (a) inequality is growing
(the distance between the economic cellar and economic penthouse), thus
cutting off the argument that things are getting better; (b) it is becoming increasingly difﬁcult for people to rise from poverty to prosperity in one or
even two generations, thus cutting off the Horatio-Alger-style anecdotes of
rags-to-riches success; (c) there is no evidence that richer children have better
prospects than poorer children because they have genetic endowments better suited to facilitate success in competitive market economies or because
their parents do a better job bringing them up and inculcating character traits
conducive to success (more intelligent, more optimistic, higher energy levels,
etc.), thus cutting off arguments of either biological or cultural superiority;
and (d) there is evidence that stereotypes and prejudice are key factors restraining upward mobility among the poor.
From our value-pluralism perspective, which holds that people rely
on simple modes of dissonance reduction until they are forced by circumstances to embrace more complex modes, this series of factual constraints
in the hypothetical society should drive conservatives to adopt more integratively complex (and centrist) policy positions. This is so because we have
now narrowed the range of plausible explanations for social inequality in
the hypothetical society to two salient candidates: better schools for the rich
and better networking opportunities for the rich. We suspect that when the
trade-offs are made this transparent, only the hardest-core conservatives and
system justiﬁers will still resist egalitarian policy interventions designed to
improve schooling opportunities and networking opportunities for the poor
(e.g., generous vouchers and afﬁrmative action outreach—although not de
facto or de jure quotas—which activate a new set of value trade-offs). These
hard-right dissenters might argue—in Burkean fashion—that previous generations of parents worked hard to ensure that their descendents would have
advantages, so it is a bad idea to destabilize that societal expectation. But
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we also suspect that most conservatives and system justiﬁers will, at this
juncture, make policy concessions and accept the need for egalitarian interventions of some form.
An unresolved question is how system justiﬁcation theorists should react
to such a result. We obviously cannot speak for them but we favor the following accommodation: people tend to be system justiﬁers up to the point at
which they feel they can no longer justify the system because it violates an
internalized ethical schema of fair play. If there remains a difference between
our position and that of system justiﬁcation, it is our objection to labeling
any ethical schema that happens to favor the status quo as merely serving
a system justiﬁcation function. Here we see a classic fuzzy-set functionalist judgment call (Tetlock, 2002), with tough questions for both camps. The
tough question for us is: How far must perceptions and reality diverge before we grant that the perceptions serve a system justiﬁcation rather than an
object appraisal function? The tough question for them is: How grounded in
reality must perceptions be before they grant that perceptions serve an object
appraisal as opposed to a system justiﬁcation function?

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

“Tormenting” System Justiﬁers with Dissonant Data
on the Effects of Trade on National Sovereignty
In the ﬁrst generation of hypothetical-society research, we brought the values of economic and market efﬁciency into conﬂict with the values of social
equality, but we never brought market efﬁciency into conﬂict with another
value also likely to rank high in the moral-political priorities of conservatives
and, by implication, high system justiﬁers. National sovereignty and security
are promising candidates.
Consider the problems posed by international trade. For orthodox, free
market theorists, the logic of comparative advantage holds that the surest
method of promoting prosperity is by permitting the free ﬂow of goods,
services, capital, and human beings across borders. If only rich countries
would just quit erecting protectionist barriers that prevent poor people
from working their way out of poverty, there would be much less poverty in the world today. Of course, this surgically simple solution can have
painful side effects—international trade can produce major dislocations
within societies. American blue-collar workers accustomed to earning $25
per hour run the risk of losing their jobs to Mexican workers glad to make
$5 per hour—and these Mexican workers, in turn, risk losing their jobs to
Chinese workers glad to make only $2 per hour.
We suspect that conservatives, and especially libertarian conservatives,
are much less worried than those on the left about the power of trade to
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increase inequality within their home society (see parallel section below on
“tormenting” system critics). But there may well be conditions under which
conservatives do become alarmed about the effects of international trade.
Consider how the following combination of facts in a hypothetical-society
paradigm would become increasingly dissonant for a conservative: (a) the
target society has a mutually beneﬁcial trading relationship with another
society, but the other society is reaping much larger economic growth beneﬁts from the trade; (b) the other society is a potential military rival that is
translating signiﬁcant fractions of its rapidly growing economy into greater
military strength; and (c) the dominant social class in the target society has a
strong vested interest in the continuation of the trading relationship with the
other society (a disproportionate share of the beneﬁts of the trade ﬂow to this
elite group within the target society) (see Herrmann, Tetlock, and Diascro,
2001).
Here, again, our suspicion would be that even high system justiﬁers will
be hard-pressed to justify supporting the interest of the dominant class in a
society so conﬁgured. There comes a point at which enough is enough: the
status quo loses its legitimacy, and even those predisposed to justify the global
free market status quo give up the cause. Again, although one may dismiss
this stress testing of system justiﬁcation theory on grounds that observers
are judging a hypothetical status quo, not their own—the real—world, this
approach at least promises evidence on the boundary conditions of SJT: Are
system justiﬁcation tendencies so automatic, and unconscious rationalization tendencies so strong, that system justiﬁcation continues even when the
obvious routes to rationalizing the legitimacy of the status quo have explicitly been cut off and the system in question is nominally hypothetical, or can
these tendencies be overridden by cutting off normal rationalization routes
at the conscious level and, if so, how easily may people be divorced from
their system justifying ideologies (or, in the case of the disadvantaged, freed
from the fog of false consciousness) (Jost, 1995)?

How Resolutely Opposed to Inequality
Should One Be to Qualify as a System Critic?
Fair play requires subjecting those on the left to the functional equivalent of
the dissonance-maximizing treatments inﬂicted on those on the right: How
far are left-leaning respondents prepared to go in opposing all forms of inequality? And what types of dissonance-reduction strategies are they prepared to adopt to deﬂect bothersome facts that pressure them to change their
minds? We focus on two examples: (a) reactions to increasingly dissonant
data on the sources of social inequality within the home society, and (b) reactions to increasingly dissonant data on the impact of protectionist barriers
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designed to protect workers in one’s own society but at the price of inﬂicting
great suffering on much poorer workers in other societies.

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

“Tormenting” System Critics with Dissonant Data
on Social Inequality
In the ﬁrst generation of hypothetical-society work, we explored the willingness of those on the left to reject increasingly meritocratic hypothetical societies by manipulating the importance of effort/ability as causes
of socio-economic status. But we never subjected the left to tougher ideological tests that probed just how far they were willing to go in pursuit
of equality as an end goal that trumps all other competing ends. Imagine,
therefore, a hypothetical society in which we preempt arguments for a wide
range of egalitarian policy interventions by stipulating that: (a) the society
already rigorously enforces equality-of-opportunity laws, thus undercutting the dissonance-reduction strategy that inequality could be eliminated
if only more aggressive action were taken against ongoing discrimination;
(b) the society has no history of ethnic or racial prejudice, thus undercutting the strategy of arguing that inequality could be eliminated if only aggressive action were taken against the residual effects of past injustices;
(c) the inequalities create powerful incentives for efﬁciency and economic
growth from which all beneﬁt, thus undercutting the strategy of arguing
that inequality could be eliminated (without making everyone poorer) if
taxation policy reallocated wealth; (d) the relatively poor are, by current
objective standards of purchasing power, already very well-off, further undercutting need-based humanitarian arguments for equality; (e) the poor
are satisﬁed with the fairness of the system or even that the poor are more
satisﬁed with the conditions of their lives than the wealthy and are making work–leisure trade-offs in favor of leisure and less income (in other
words, the poor realize that, beyond a certain point, which they feel they
have reached, higher income does not buy greater happiness; Kahneman,
Krueger, & Schkade, 2006); (f) scientiﬁc evidence has revealed that children from wealthier families have genetic endowments that are, on average, better adapted for success in competitive market economies and that,
whenever lower-class children have the “right stuff,” they do indeed rise
into higher socio-economic classes (thus reafﬁrming that equality of opportunity does exist); (g) scientiﬁc research indicates that, short of mandating poverty for all, there are only two remaining mechanisms for breaking
down social class barriers—nature or nurture—either genetic engineering
designed to level the DNA playing ﬁeld or socializing the task of socializing
children and requiring that all children be raised in state-run institutions
that prevent higher-class parents from giving special advantages to their
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children (from elaborate bedtime stories to excessive homework help) and
lower-class parents from teaching their children impulsive and hedonistic
values detrimental to success.
Choreographing the background facts to maximize dissonance for egalitarians is obviously a complex, iterative process, best done in adversarial
collaboration with rival theoretical camps. Here, though, we are most interested in the choices that egalitarians make when the only economically
and technologically feasible method of achieving egalitarian goals requires
acknowledging the tension between the values of social equality and family
autonomy.
Radical egalitarians—from Rousseau to Marx—have long recognized
this tension: as long as the family is the social unit primarily responsible for
socializing children, and as long as some families are (even holding income
constant) prepared to make much greater sacriﬁces to ensure the success of
their children, it is logically impossible to achieve equality of opportunity.
Socializing children is a relatively easy choice from this radically egalitarian point of view—and many socialist governments have indeed pursued
this “it-takes-a-village” option (from Israeli kibbutzim to Scandinavian day
care to Chinese communes). Conservative and libertarian philosophers have
long resisted such arguments and warned that transferring the task of socializing children to the state is both a violation of parental rights and a dangerous step toward totalitarianism and collective mind control. Rejecting a
prominent state role in childcare is a relatively easy choice from these points
of view.
Our working hypothesis is, however, that, for most people, the choice is
a tough one. We suspect that most people—system critics and system justiﬁers alike—are value pluralists who are deeply torn by this value conﬂict
and oscillate erratically between favoring family autonomy versus equality
of opportunity as a function of horror stories of child neglect and abuse (favoring the left) and horror stories of state mind control and parents losing
parental rights for “trivial” reasons (favoring the right). Extrapolating from
earlier work on the value pluralism model (Tetlock, 1986; Tetlock et al., 1996),
we also suspect that people (especially egalitarians now) can be motivated to
invest the necessary cognitive effort to generate complex compromise solutions to the dilemma only to the degree that we have systematically blocked
off simple modes of dissonance resolution in the hypothetical societies. These
tempting simpler modes of dissonance reduction include challenging the
“fact situation” posited in the hypothetical society (such as “the poor aren’t
really as happy as the rich; that is just false consciousness” and “behavioralgenetics claims are just racist”) and trying to ﬁnd a trade-off-free solution
(creating a state-funded system in which social class distinctions disappear
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because everyone develops to her full potential). The key question is: What
value trade-offs do egalitarians make when constrained by the factual and
causal ground rules of the hypothetical society—and when they cannot
make up facts of their own liking? The value pluralism model predicts that
the more highly respondents value both equality and the family, the more
excruciatingly complex the judgment calls will become of balancing parental
control and social equality in designing exact institutional rules. If integratively complex policy reasoning is a reasonable approximation of one’s ideal
cognitive process outcome (and that seems to be the case for advocates of
deliberative democracy; e.g., Fishkin, 1992), this would be how to achieve it
via the hypothetical-society paradigm.
The process may seem torturous because the goal is to explore the conditions under which even unrelenting system critics relent. Or, framed as a
question for system justiﬁcation theorists, how dogmatic (principled) an opponent of inequality must system critics be to avoid reclassiﬁcation as system
justiﬁers? For instance, and we doubt that system justiﬁcation theorists take
this extreme a position, if the price of avoiding the label “system justiﬁer” is
compelling all families to accept a one-size-ﬁts-all child-rearing system that
guarantees equality of outcome, we suspect that 90% plus of the population will qualify as system justiﬁers. Simply put, would a system justiﬁcation
theorist consider adherence to the existing American family structure, which
vests considerable autonomy and responsibility for child development in the
parents and which surely breeds societal inequality, evidence of the system
justiﬁcation motive at work? If not, why not? In any event, if system justiﬁcation is to be more than a vague expression of political disapproval, as system
justiﬁcation theorists surely mean it to be, we need much tighter speciﬁcation
of the value and policy litmus tests being used—implicitly or explicitly—by
system justiﬁcation theorists.

“Tormenting” System Critics with International Trade Scenarios
In the ﬁrst generation of hypothetical-society research, we were content to
rely on crude operational deﬁnitions of the poverty line, assuming that everyone shared an understanding of, and aversion to, poverty. What counts as
poor, however, in one society at one point in history may count as wealthy
for that same society at a previous point in history or for other societies at
the same point in history. Upper middle class professionals in parts of subSaharan Africa in the early 21st century have per capita incomes substantially
lower (even using a purchasing-power-parity standard) than the average factory worker in Western Europe or the United States.
In the hypothetical-society paradigm, we can require subjects to assume—
as noted earlier—that the logic of comparative advantage in international trade
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holds: the surest method of reducing large income gaps across societies is by
promoting the free ﬂow of goods, services, capital, and human beings across
borders. How, then, should one respond if one is an egalitarian asked to judge
the acceptability of a trade agreement that will increase inequality within one’s
own wealthy society (because the paychecks of one’s “own” working class are
in decline as the result of lower labor cost competition in poorer societies) but
will also raise the absolute standard of living of the poorest people in poor societies, as well as decrease inequality between societies (by raising the overall
per capita income of poorer societies closer to that of wealthier societies)? The
predictions we can extract from SJT presumably hinge on whether we choose
to deﬁne the system critics as cosmopolitan egalitarians, concerned more with
inequality on a global scale, or as parochial egalitarians, concerned solely with
inequality within their own society. And the data we can extract from the study
will probably hinge on the escape routes that we offer respondents in hypothetical societies from this dissonance-inducing problem (escape routes such
as reserving some wealth generated by free trade for transfer payments to
help those in one’s own society most adversely affected by free trade, the solution preferred by value-pluralistic neo-liberals such as Robert Rubin [Rubin &
Weisberg, 2004] and Thomas Friedman [2005]).
Again, the “system” in system justiﬁcation theory is underdeﬁned.10 The
theory offers little guidance on how to apply it to complex debates that activate clashing values—and on which reasonable people disagree. We see
roughly equally strong arguments for classifying “egalitarian” protectionists in wealthy countries as either system justiﬁers or system critics—and
no good reason to suppose that psychologists deserve any special deference
in the answers they might give as to which systems should count, except to
the extent that their answers are founded on empirical data. If conservatives
become system critics and liberals become system justiﬁers in the “America
becoming more open to international trade” scenario, and if other similar reversals can be identiﬁed, then it becomes difﬁcult to argue that the perpetuation of economic inequality or the defense of the status quo per se generally
triggers system-justifying tendencies in those deemed high system justiﬁers
in the United States, namely, conservatives (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady,
2003; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In such a case, we see the
beneﬁt of the hypothetical-society approach as pushing toward a more con-

10

Blasi and Jost (2006) recognize this problem and note the need for studies to determine

when one system will prevail over another in cases of system conﬂict, but to our knowledge,
little or no research addresses this question.
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textualized theory about the conditions under which system-justifying, and
system critical, tendencies should occur.

Copyright © 2009. Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

CONCLUSION
The hypothetical-society paradigm may well be the best of the many imperfect methodological means at our disposal for testing the relative merits
of more transparent-motivational and more subterranean-motivational theories of public policy reasoning. Here, it is instructive to recall just how deep
the indeterminacy problems are in testing a theory such as system justiﬁcation in the real world. We repeatedly run into variations on C. Wright Mills’
vocabulary-of-motives problem: one person’s reason for holding a belief
(say, about social class differences in achievement values or about the wisdom of the market) can typically be dismissed by others as a mere rationalization (say, as a means of justifying existing inequality or as evidence
of insensitivity to the residual effects of past and current discrimination).
Rubin and Hewstone (2004) make a somewhat analogous point when they
argue that system justiﬁcation theory should not get explanatory credit for
phenomena, such as attributional favoritism toward higher-status groups,
that could simply be the result of people observing depressing patterns of covariation between group membership and outcomes in society at large (e.g.,
the higher levels of crime, family breakdown, drug abuse, school failure,
and so on among the poor). To use their analogy to a football game, should
we conclude that members of the losing team who attribute their defeat to
their own shortcomings are, ipso facto, guilty of outgroup favoritism and
system justiﬁcation? Or, should we conclude that they are engaging in highly
adaptive forms of self-criticism? Indeed, it is worth asking what happens to
disadvantaged groups that develop political cultures that censure all selfcritical commentary as evidence that the commentator has been co-opted
by the oppressors. Do they not risk trapping themselves in an ideology of
victimology?
The list of Millsian reason-rationalization riddles is a long one. For instance, if one believes that prosperity and economic efﬁciency require creating
incentives for hard work and risk-taking (incentives that inevitably create inequality), does that belief count as evidence for the operation of a system justiﬁcation motive (one’s belief that the wealthy are being rewarded for merit)
or as evidence simply that one understands a fundamental scientiﬁc principle
of economics (for the former view, see Jost et al., 2003)? If one believes that
a social system with stable, secure property rights is essential for promoting
prosperity and economic efﬁciency, does that count as evidence of a desire for
unequal relations among social groups, or does it count as evidence that one
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has drawn correct lessons from history—at least according to one inﬂuential
school of economic history (North, 1981, 2005)? If one believes that ego resilience, intelligence, the capacity to delay gratiﬁcation, and a strong work ethic
are found more often among the economically successful, does that count as
evidence that one has been gulled into accepting system-justifying Horatio
Alger stories (cf. Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007), as evidence that one is in
touch with sociological reality (as Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, suggest), or as
evidence that one has embraced an adaptive illusion (Taylor & Brown, 1988)?
These questions are unanswerable in real-world debates because it is
so easy for advocates—motivated reasoners that we all are to some degree
(Kunda, 1999)—to invent facts and double standards that conceal potential trade-offs (an invention process that, if it is to serve its subterraneanmotivational function, should occur out of awareness and be invisible to
others). But these questions become answerable in the hypothetical-society
paradigm because it is so difﬁcult for advocates to conceal the same trade-offs
in a world in which all of the key factual parameters have been speciﬁed by
experimental ﬁat. The hypothetical-society paradigm then becomes the platform for previously impossible conversations between theorists. For instance,
even if we are right and if transparent-motivational theories can outmaneuver
subterranean-motivational theories in carefully choreographed hypothetical
societies that compel conscious acknowledgment of complex value trade-offs,
subterranean-motivational theorists still have a number of reasonable counterarguments. They can posit that socially undesirable motivational forces only
come into play when enough attributional ambiguity exists to permit rationalization covers—or that such motives only come into play in settings that
better simulate real-world status relationships. We do not dismiss such arguments as patch-up operations of a degenerating research program. Such defenses may well be defensible, and the best way to tell is by gradually adding
the requisite complexity and realism to hypothetical-society studies.
In brief, if we want to escape otherwise intractable disputes over political
motive attribution, we need to explore human judgment in imaginary social
worlds that we can experimentally manipulate in precisely targeted ways
that reﬂect the key conceptual parameters of real-world political debates.
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